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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

SUSAN H. PARKER; DANA
SCHACK; J. RAND HIRSCHI,
and all other persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
HONORABLE CALVIN L. RAMPTON, Governor of the State of Utah;
and HONORABLE VERNON B.
ROMNEY, Attorney General of the
State of Utah,

Case No.
12494

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This matter is an appeal from a decision of the
Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, presiding, in which the District Court construed Sections 64-10-1 through 14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to apply only to inmates or patients in state
institutions and as having no regulatory effect on any
other person in the state of Utah desiring to undergo
or perform a sterilization operation.
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
In a hearing held in the District Court before the
Honorable Stewart J\1. Hanson, the plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment was granted on January 20, 1971. Judgment was entered on January 2.5,
1971. (R. 38-42). Thereafter, the plaintiffs discovered
that an erroneous Judgment had been entered and
moved the Court to correct it. (R. 36-37). After a hearing on the question of correcting the Judgment held on
the 8th day of April, 1970, the Court held that the original Judgment was erroneous in that it did not fully
describe the holding of the Court as set forth in the
:Memorandum Decision of the Court ( R. 43-44), and
the proffered Amended Judgment was held to be the
proper Judgment of the Court. This Amended J udgment was entered accordingly. (R. 46-50). The Amended Judgment held that the provisions of the Utah Sterilization Code, Sections 64-10-1 through 14, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, are part of the State Institutions Title
of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, and as such, apply
only to persons in state institutions and as such, have
no effect on any person outside of said institutions.
( R. 49-50) . The Court also determined that a proper
class action existed and entered an injunction enjoining enforcement of the provisions of Sections 64-10-1
through 14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, specifically,
the criminal provisions of Section 64-10-12, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, with respect to all non-institutionalized
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persons and their physicians in the State of Utah. (R.
46-50).

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents seek affirmation of the decision
and order of Partial Summary Judgment, as amended,
entered in the District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The respondents would accept the Statement of
Facts as set forth in the first paragraph in Appellants'
Brief ( p. 2-3), but contrary to the allegations contained
in the second paragraph of the Statement of Facts in
the Appellants' Brief (p. 3), the Court did specifically
hold that the three-named plaintiffs were legitimate representatives of a class, that is:
" ... all persons in the State of Utah who
desire to undergo voluntary sterilization operations who are not confined in or patients in
state institutions, which class of persons is so
numerous that it is impractical to bring them
all before the court, and that the plaintiffs
have fairly and adequately represented their
rights and the questions of law presented in
this action are common to the whole class.

4

ARGUIVIENT
POINT I.
THE QUESTION PRESENTED IN THE
INSTANT CASE, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF AN Al\1BIGUOUS STATUTE,
IS AN APPROPRIATE ONE FOR THE
COURTS.
A. APPELLANTS 1\1 A Y NOT
PROPERLY RAISE THE ISSUE OF
\VHETHER OR NOT THIS CASE
P RE S E N T S A NON JUSTICIABLE
POLITICAL QUESTION AT THIS
POINT IN THE PROCEEDINGS.
Appellants assert in Point I of their Brief that
the instant declaratory action is a nonjusticiable political
question and the District Court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction. This argument was never
raised by the appellants in any fashion in the District
Court. It is not raised in the pleadings. Its appearance
comes on the first time for appeal. This Court has consistently held that matters not raised in the pleadings
nor put in issue at the trial cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. urilliamson v. Denver and Rio
Grande TfT cstcrn Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d, 487 P.2d
316 ( 1971) ; TfT agner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482
P.2d 702 ( 1971) ; Simpson v. General IJJ otors Corp., 24
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Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970); In Re: Estate of
Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 ( 1967); Riter v.
Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967). The rationale of this rule was clearly articulated in Simpson
v. General Motors Corp., supra:
" . . . Orderly procedure, whose proper
purpose is the final settlement of controversies, requires that a party must present his
entire case and theory or theories of recovery
to the trial court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter change to some different theory
and thus attempt to keep in motion a merrygo-round litigation." 24 Utah 2d at 303, 470
P.2d at 401.
This rule should be applied in the instant matter and
the appellants' argument should be disregarded by this
Court.
B. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IN THE INSTANT MATTER,
THAT IS, JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF AN AMBIGUOUS STATUTE, IS NOT A P 0 LIT I CAL
QUESTION.

Appellants assert in their Brief that the instant matter involves a political question which is nonjusticiable
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 3-12). The appellants discuss
this matter in terms of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
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7 L.Ed. 2d 663, 82 S. Ct. 691 ( 1962). However, they
fail to examine this question in view of the subsequent
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Powell
v. "]}JcCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 23 L.Ed. 2d 491, 89 S.
Ct. 1944 (1969). In Part V of that decision, the United
States Supreme Court pointed out that there is a
distinct difference between jurisdicaton and justiciability. The recitation by the Court of the history of the
case of Powell v. ]}[ cCormack through the District
Court and the Court of Appeals is an excellent example
of analyzing these questions. The District Court determined that the case was one that could not be decided because there would be no jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The Court of Appeals, next considering this case, held that there was jurisdiction over the
subject matter, but that the case was not justiciable.
The Supreme Court analyzed carefully both contentions and rejected them. The Supreme Court analyzed
Article III of the United States Constitution and held
that if the federal courts had jurisdiction the case had
to be one over which the federal courts had jurisdiction
under the provisions of Article III of the Constitution
of the United States of America. In this same pattern.
this Court would examine Article I, Section 11, of the
Constitution of the State of Utah, which provides:
''All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by
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due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party."
to determine if the Courts of the State of Utah have
jurisdiction of the question presented in the instant matter. The respondents and the class that they represent
in this case have based their claim for relief upon the
fact that an ambiguous statute of the State of Utah
has caused them personal injury. This type of claim
falls within the constitutionally established jurisdiction
of the Courts of the State of Utah. Accordingly, if
there is any merit to the appellants' claim at all, it
would have to be that the mattter raised a question of
justiciability, not jurisdiction.
The question of justiciability was analyzed by the
United States Supreme Court in both Baker v. Carr,
snpra, and Powell v. "JtlcCorrnack, supra. The appellants claim this case raises a nonjusticiable question because the question presented is a political question (Ap-.
pellants' Brief, pp. 3-12). They quote the six-fold test
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Bal.:er v. Carr, supra. They then state that three of the
six eriteria are met (they concede by implication the
other three do not) .
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The first criteria is:
"Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department ... " 369 U.S. at 217.
The appellants fail to point to any textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of this issue to a coordinate political department. The sterilization chapter in
the State Institutions Title of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 (Chapter 10 of Title 64), is, as is any other
chapter of the State Institutions Title, a set of directions to the Executive Department how the matters of
the state institutions shall be run. No constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department is cited by the appellants because none exists. 1
The second test raised by the appellants is:
"Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found ...
the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion ... "
1 This is made particularly clear by comparing this question w!th
the question involved in Powell v.
supra, which
was the qualification of an elected c1t1zen to sit as a
of the House of Representatives and the power of that coordinate branch of the United States Government to expell one of
its members under the provisions of Section 5 of Article I of
the Constitution of the United States of America.

9

Appellants argue that the sterilization question involves
policies which are within the providence of the Legislature and are out of the hands of the Court. Appellants,
in so maintaining, fail to observe the difference between
an issue of policy vis-a-vis the political nonjusticiability
question. Public policy is a matter that has been traditionally examined in every sterilization case before the
Conrts of this land and it has been used as a method
of interpretation of the statutes involved. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 ( 1927); In Re: Salloum, 236 Mich. 478, 210
N.,V. 498 (1926) (Eugenic Sterilization); Davis v.
Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (punitive sterilir,ation) ; Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46,
88 Atl. 963 (1913) (Eugenic sterilization); and State
'1'. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912) (punitive
sterilization) . The United States Supreme Court in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, and Buck v. Bell, supra,
examined and applied the public policies behind the sterilization procedures of the states. In so doing, the
Court examined policy determinations that had already
been made by a Legislature. It was not initiating new
policies. In the much closer and certainly politically
more sensitive issues examined by the United States
Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, supra, and Powell

v. JllcCormack, s1tpra, the Supreme Court did not initiate policy. It determined those public policies that
were embodied in the laws and constitutional provisions
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involved, and, having determined them, applied them
accordingly. This is the classic function of the courts.
In the instant matter, that is what the respondents requested of the Trial Court. In reaching his decision,
the Trial Court carefully examined the legislative history of these stautes in light of the Constitution of the
State of Utah. He determined the policies of the Legislature as expressed in the statutes. He did not enact
new policy. The Court merely carried out the traditional
functions of the Court in determining the meaning of
our Legislature where a question has been raised as to
the meaning of the statute enacted by the Legislature.
The third and final formulation raised by the appellants from Baker v. Carr, supra, is:
"Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found ...
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, ... "
As the appellants state:
"In other words, there is no satisfactory
criterium for judicial management." (p. 7,
Appellants' Brief).
The District Court decided this matter. He clearly felt
there were judicially-manageable standards for resolving the questions raised. The appellants claim that the
ramifications of the decision are such that they indicate
a lack of judicially-manageable standards for resolving
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the issue. Aside from the fact that this terrible situation
was not pointed out to or seen sua sponte by the trial
court, the criteria itself states that there must be a lack
of judicially-manageable standards for resolving the
question. In the instant matter, there are clearly satisfactory judicially-manageable standards. The question
presented to the Court is whether the statutes involved
govern only inmates or patients in state institutions
rather than the population at large. The Court held that
it governed only inmates or patients in state institutions.
This clearly presents manageable standards for resolving the issue. This becomes even more clear when it is
noted that Utah is only one of two or three states in
the United States which has even a questionable restriction on the right of its citizens to undergo or perform
voluntary sterilization. "Elective Sterilization," 113 Pa.
L. R. 415 ( 1965) ; Forbes, "Voluntary Sterilization of
Women as a Right, 18 DePaul L. R. 560 ( 1969) ;
'\T olfe, "Legal and Psychiatric Aspects of Voluntary
Sterilization," 3 J. Family L. 103 (1963); Comment,
IV, San Francisco L. R. 159 (1966); "Voluntary Sterilization," Consumer Reports 384 ( 1971). The formulation articulates that the test is the lack of standards
for resolving the issues. This situation simply does not
exist as the Courts of several jurisdictions have readily
handled this question for quite some time without discovering they were without standards to do so. "Elective Sterilization," 113 Pa. L. R. 415 (1965).
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The situation confronting the Trial Court, in other
words, was not one involving a political question. It
was one involving the traditional role accorded to the
courts, that is, to interpret the law. The contention of
the appellants that the question raised in this case is a
political question is without merit and should be treated
by this Court accordingly.
POINT II.
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 64-10-1
THROUGH 14, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, GOVERN STERILIZATION OPERATIONS FOR
OR PATIENTS IN
STATE INSTITUTIONS AND DO NOT GOVERN OR RESTRICT VOLUNARY STERILIZATION OPERATIONS FOR CITIZENS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH OUTSIDE OF
THOSE INSTITUTIONS.
The provisions of Section 64-10-12, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, which state:
"Except as authorized by this chapter,
every person who performs, encourages, assists in or otherwise promotes the performance
of any of the operations described in this
chapter for the purpose of destroying the
power to procreate the human species, unless
the same shall be a medical necessity, is guilty
of a felony."
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are part of Chapter 64, Title 10, Utah Code Annotated
19.53, dealing with state institutions and, consequently,
should be interpreted to apply only to persons residing
in or held in state institutions.
At the outset, it should be pointed out to the Court
that the position advanced by the respondents that the
provisions of Section 64-10-12, Utah Code Annotated
1953, are part of the State Institutions Code and apply
only to inmates or patients in State Institutions is, in
fact, a position adopted by the Attorney General of the
State of Utah in his Opinion No. 68-040, published on
July 1 7, 1968. That Opinion said:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF UTAH
OPINION OF LAW
No. 68-040
Requested by Mr. Ronald N. Boyce, Salt
Lake County Bar Legal Services, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
Prepared by Attorney General Phil L. Hansen and staff.
QUESTION
Is it legally permissible for noninstitutionalized persons in the State of Utah to voluntarily
submit to an operation, the purpose of which
is to destroy the power to procreate?
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CONCLUSION
Yes.

* * * *
OPINION
It is the opinion of this office that there is
no statutory provision in the State of Utah
which would prohibit a person -..vho is not institutionalized from voluntarily w1dergoing an
operation, the purpose of which is to sterilize.
A provision of the Utah Code, which upon
first glance appears applicable to this situation, states:
Except as authorized by this chapter, every
person who performs, encourages, assists in
or otherwise promotes the performance of
any of the operations described in this chapter for the purpose of destroying the po,ver to procreate the human species, unless
the same shall be a medical necessity, is
guilty of a f elony. 1
This provision should be interpreted as a limitation and check on officials vested with the
authority under this section of seeking the
sterilization of institutionalized persons. The
obvious purpose is to insure that statutory procedures set forth in this section are not disregarded.
1

Rep!. Vol. Utah Code Ann.

§

64-10-12 (1961).
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The Utah State Legislature has also enacted a
statute which provides:
X othing in this chapter shall be construed
to prevent the medical or surgical treatment,
for sound therapeutic reasons, of any person by a physician or surgeon licensed by
this state, which treatment may incidentally
involve the destruction of the reproductive
functions. 2
This office interprets the prov1s10n set forth
above as intended to protect physicians or
surgeons who, in treating institutionalized persons, are required as an incident of that treatment to destroy the reproductive functions.
This provision provides protection from the
application of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 64-10-12 ( 1961) previously quoted, because
in the usual case arising under the provision
exempting legitimate treatment by a physician,
the statutory procedures for sterilization cannot be observed.
The opinions advanced by this office are reinforced by the fact that every provision dealing with
as such is found within
Title 64 entitled "State Institutions."
Therefore, there is nothing in the Utah Code
to prevent voluntary sterilization in cases inYolvin<T
c-, noninstitutionalized persons.
z Rep!. Vol. Utah Code Ann.

§

64-10-11 (1961).
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Dated this 17th day of July, 1968.
Attorney General Phil L. Hansen
PLHlrjslbgp
By examination of the Answer filed by the appellants
to the Complaint in this matter and the Brief submitted
to the Court by them in the instant matter, it is apparent that the appellants now take the position
that the Opinion by the State Attorney General
is not a correct interpretation of this law. In fact, the
Attorney General now asserts that this provision, Section 64-10-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is, in fact,
clear and unambiguous on its face, 2 but it now has a
meaning clearly the opposite of that which his predecessor in office felt it had.
Respondents would submit that the appellants'
current position is in error, and the correct interpretation of this statute is the one set forth in Opinion No.
z In stating this proposition, appellants apparently did not read
the full discussion of Sutherland's Point in § 4502, Swtherland's
Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed. (1943), as he states: "This
rule hides, although it uses many words to disguise it, the
basic fallacy that words have meaning in and of themselves .
. . . A word is but a symbol which may stand for one of an
innumerable number of objects. It is only as custom and usage
and agrerment attach a particular meaning to a particular word
that it has any significance in relation to either a tangible or
intangible object. Thus, the words used in the statute are always uncertain of meaning." If one then goes back to examine
the introductory part of this section of the treatise, § 4501, it
gives a good general explanation of Lord Coke's formulation
of the rule for interpreting statutes. It would be submitted
that the District Court correctly applied this rule in examination of the statutes in issue.
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68-0.,tO, and the opinion of the Trial Court in the instant
matter. In support of this position, the respondents
would assert that the legislative history of this Chapter
of the Utah Code supports their contentions. At the outset, it must be noted that Secion 23 of Article VI of
the Constitution of the State of Utah provides:
"Except general appropriations bills and
bills for codification and general revision of
law, no bill shall be passed containing more
than one subject, which shall be clearly e,rpressed in its title." (Emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has recently stated in State v.
1'witchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075 (1959), that
this provision requires that the subject matter of the
act be reasonably related to the title and that all parts
of the act be reasonably related to each other. Accordingly, interpretation of this statute, in view of this
thus construed constitutional provision, would require
this Court to interpret Section 64-10-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, in light of its legislative history, so as to
construe it to be constitutional. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the legislative history of the enactment
of this provision to determine its correct present construction.
The predecessor of what is now Section 64-10-12,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, was Section 7 in the original Act, which was Senate Bill No. 135, which was passed
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March 12, 1925, and went into effect on May 12, 1925,
Laws of Utah 1925, Chapter 82. The Act was entitled
"STERILIZATION OF SEXUAL CRIMINALS, IDIOTS, ETC." and was described as "An
Act to prevent the procreation of habitual, sexual criminals, idiots, epileptics, imbecils, and insane, and providing penalties for violation thereof." (Emphasis added)
Thus, as originally enacted, the Act was clearly stated
in its title and description as being intended to apply
only to that narrow category of persons described in
the title and description, and not to the citizens of Utah
in general.
The Act was next amended in 1929 by Senate Bill
No. 207, which was passed on :March 14, 1929, and went
into effect on l\fay 14, 1929, Laws of Utah 1929, Chapter .59. This Act was entitled "STERILIZATION OF
SEXUAL CRIMINALS, IDIOTS, ETC.," and it
was described as "An Act amending Sections 1, 2 and
3, Chapter 82, Laws of Utah 1925, relating to the sterilization of sea;ual criminals, and idiots, epileptics, imbecils, and insane." (Emphasis added) This amendatory
Act altered the provisions dealing with the Court procedure required to obtain a sterilization.
The next amendment of this Act was in 1945.3 It
3

These amendments were a legislative response to Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), see Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah
80 276 Pac. 921 ( 1929), which had relied upon Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927), which decision was overruled by the
United States Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra.
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was House Bill No. 87, which was passed on February
24, 1945, and went into effect on May 8, 1945, Laws
of Utah 1045, Chapter 130. The Act was entitled
"STERILIZATION", but it was described as "An
Act Amending Sections 89-0-1, 89-0-2, 89-0-3, 89-0-4,
89-0-5, 89-0-6, 89-0-7, and 89-0-8, Utah Code Annotated
1943, Relating to and Providing for the Sterilization of
Certain Persons, JVhich Shall Include Any Inmate Confined to State Institution, or Persons Adjudged to be
Insane, and Idiots, Imbecils, Feeble-111inded, or Epileptic, Defining Powers and Duties of Persons and
Boards in Charge of State Institutions in Relation
Thereto and Right of Appeal to District Courts and
Enacting Two New Sections to be Known as 89-0-13
and 89-0-14, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Defining
Terms in Relation to Act." Emphasis added)
The Act was next amended in 1961, where the
amending Act, that is Chapter 154 of the Laws of Utah
1961, was gathered under those acts dealing with State
Institutions, page 486, Laws of Utah 1961. The amending bill was House Bill No. 147 and it was passed on
March 9, 1961, and went into efffect on l\Iay 9, 1961.
It was Chapter 154, entitled "STERILIZATION OF

MENTALLY IMPAIRED" and was described as
"An Act Amendina Section 64-10-6 and Section 6410-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Relating to the Steril-

i;:;ation of the Mentally Impaired." (Emphasis added)
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It is clear f rorn examination of the original enactment "STERILIZATION OF SEXUAL CRil\IIN ALS, IDIOTS, ETC." and the decription of the Act
printed thereunder, that the sterilization provisions were
intended to apply only to the sterilization of sexual
criminals, idiots, epileptics, people adjudged insane, etc.
Accordingly, the Act was codified with state institutions
dealing with these persons, currently Title 64, Chapter
10, Utah Code Annotated 1953. If this provision, Section 64-10-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, were entitled to apply to the population at large rather than
just the inmates of all institutions, it would have been
made a part of the Criminal Code of the State of Utah
and not a part of the Code dealing with sterilization of
inmates of state institutions. This construction of the
Act is required by the Constitution of the State of
Utah, Section 23 of Article VI. This is in accord with
the general rule that:

"The dominant objective of the prov1s10ns is
to insure the titling of legislative acts in a
manner that will give reasonable notice of the
purview to the members of the assembly, and
to the public. All that is necessary is that anyone interested in or affected by the subject
matter of the bill be put upon inquiry. The
general test is whether the title is uncertain,
misleading or deceptive to the average reader,
and if the Court feels that the title is sufficient
to direct a person of ordinary, reasonably inquiring mind to the body of the act, compliance
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with the Constitution has been effected." Section 1702, Sutherland on Statutory Construction.
Application of the rules to the instant case would
indicate that all notice is provided that these acts deal
with sterilization of criminals, imbecils, idiots, epileptics, people who are imprisoned or are patients in state
institutions. It does not give any notice or any type of
notice that any part of the Act is to prohibit sterilization of any or all of the citizens of the State of Utah.
Accordingly, the Act should be construed as to be constitutional and to apply the restriction on the sterilization in accord ·with its legislative history and the constitutional requirements set forth above and be deemed
to apply only to persons in state institutions who are
convicted of sexual crimes or who are idiots, imbecils,
maniacs, etc. as defined in Title 64, Chapter 10, Utah
Code Annotated 1953. Any other construction would
render Section 64-10-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
unconstitutional. This is underlined by Section 64-10-11,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, which as pointed out by
the Attorney General in Opinion No. 68-040, limits
the provisions of Chapter 10 of Title 64 so that none
of the provisions thereof are to apply to physicians in
the State rendering legitimate treatments to any of
their patients.
The appellants next cite to the Court the previous
<lccision of this Court in Davis v. TValton, 74 Utah 80,
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276 P.2d 921 (1929), as support for their position that
the statute has been upheld as being not a cruel and
unusual punishment and therefore unconstitutional.
Respondents respectfully note that this decision was in
large measure based upon the decision of the United
States Sul)reme Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
( 1927), which decision 'vas reversed by the United
States Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 ( 1942), and it was as a result of this decision
that the 1945 Amendments heretofore described on p.
18 were enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Utah to the Sterilization Code. In addition, that case
did not consider the point in question as the case concerned an inmate in a state institution and raised no
question about the general applicability of the statute.
Finally, the District Court, construing follmving
its constitutional and judicial mandate to find a statute
constitutional. if at all possible, Trade Commission v.
Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d
958 (1968), construed Section 64-10-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, in such a manner as to avoid the Constitutional challenge by the Respondents who, in addition
to the statutory point discussed aboYe, asserted that a
blanket prohibition against voluntary sterilization would
be a violation of the Ninth Amendment right to marital
privacy. Griswold 'l'. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 14
L.Ecl.2d 510, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). This challenge was
not passed on by the Trial Court at the time it construe<l
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the instant statute to apply only to inmates in state institutions. By this construction of the Act, the Court
was not required to examine the constitutional question
and as such was fallowing traditional judicial restraint.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Trial
Court in its holding that Section 64-10-12, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, applies only to prisoners, inmates or
patients in state institutions and has no application to
citizens or physicians in the State of Utah outside of
these institutions who desire to undergo or to perform
yoJuntary sterilization operations.
POINT III.
THE INSTANT ACTION 'VAS A TRUE
AND PROPER CLASS ACTION.
Rule 23 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
"If persons constituting a class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, such of them, one or
more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be
sued, when the character of the right sought to
be enforced for or against the class is
(I) joint, or common, or secondary in
the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of
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the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce
it;
several, and the object of the action
is the adjudication of claims which do or may
affect specific property involved in the action;
or
(2)

( 3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights
and a common relief is sought."
The District Court applied this rule to the case before
it and determined that:
" ... all persons in the State of Utah who
desire to undergo voluntary sterilization operations who are not confined in or patients in
state institutions, which class of persons is so
numerous that it is impractical to bring them
all before the court, and that the plaintiffs
have fairly and adequately represented their
rights and the questions of law presented in
this action are common to the whole class."
(R. 47-48).
Appellants complain that the Trial Court did not hold
a hearing to determine this question, but at the hearing
held on this matter no such objection was raised. 4 Appellants seem to imply that the Trial Court should have
4

Accordingly, they should be barred from raising this question
at this point. Williamson v. Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co., supra; Wagner v. Olsen, supra; Simpson v. Genr
eral Motors Corp., supra; In Re: Estate of Ekker, supra; and
Riter v. Cayias, supra.
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handled this matter pursuant to the June 23, 1971,
amendments to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, these amendments will not be in
effect until January 1, 1972. The tests that a court
would have to make in determining that a matter was
a proper class action are set out in the current Rule 23.
The initial test is whether or not the persons constituting the class are so numerous as to make it impractical
to bring them all before the Court. In the instant matter, the respondents alleged that they represented a
class of persons made up of persons in the State of
Utah desiring to undergo voluntary sterilization who
could not do so as their physicians had informed them
that, because of the provisions of Section 64-10-12, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, they were unwilling to perform
that operation, as they had been advised by their counsel that they might be guilty of committing a felony.
The Trial Court held that it was impossible to determine
how many people inside the State of Utah there are
who desire to undergo voluntary sterilization, but have
been advised by their physicians that this operation
cannot be performed. Accordingly, he held that this
action was an appropriate class action insofar as the
number of persons constituting the class was so numerous as to make it impractical to bring them before the
Court. The current Rule 23 does not require a separate
hearing for such a determination and none was held.
The matter was simply considered along with all the
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other matters raised in the .l\Iotion for Partial Summary
Judgment. This is an appropriate determination reached
ma proper manner.
Next, the Court determined that the respondents
would fairly insure adequate representation for all
members of this class and that the character of the right
songht to be enforced presented a common question of
law. The Court made the determination that this was
a true class action following the test enunciated by this
Court in Salt Lake City v. Utah Lake Farmers Ass'n,
4 Utah 2d 14, 286 P.2d 773 (1955):
". . . ( 1) The true representation class
action involves the enforcement of a right
which is joint, common or secondary, the judgment in such case will affect similarly all
members of the class and should be conclusive
and binding on all such members the same as
if they were parties to the action ... " 4 Utah 2d
at 24, 286 P .2d at 779.

Every person who desires to undergo or perform a
sterilization operation will clearly be affected by and
bound by the construction of the statutes which may
or may not govern such acts. They are bound by the
judgment of the Court, as though they were parties
to this action. The Trial Court concluded that all these
criteria were met and entered judgment accordingly.
The appellants challenge the procedure and conclusions
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of the Trial Court, but both are proper under the present rules of procedure and directives enunciated by this
Court. These conclusions and the orders entered in accordance "-ith them should, accordingly, be affirmed.
POINT IV.
THE PARTIES BEFORE THE COURTS
'VERE THE PROPER PARTIES TO BRING
BEFORE THE COURTS IN THIS ACTION.
The appellants as part of their Fourth Point on
Appeal (Appellants' Brief, pp. 24-28), maintain that
not all of the necessary parties were properly joined
under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and therefore the District Court did not have jurisdiction in this matter. They maintained that the county attorneys and district attorneys throughout the State (or
at least the Salt Lake County Attorney and Third Judicial District District Attorney) should have been
brought before the Court as necessary parties to this
action. They allege that this is contrary to Rule 19 (a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and in the absence of said parties, complete relief cannot be accorded
by the present action. Respondents maintain and the
Trial Court held that this is not bue. It would be submitted that the County Attorney and the District Attorney for Salt Lake County or any other county that
were to be involved in or affected by this litigation is
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not a necessary or even proper party. The proper parties
are the Governor and Attorney General of the State of
Utah.
Under the prov1s10ns of Article VII, Section 5,
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, the Governor
of the State of Utah is charged with the duty to "see
that the laws are faithfully executed;" and "he shall
transact all executive business with the officers of the
government, . . . "The Governor's duties are further
specifically spelled out in Section 67-1-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, wherein it states:
"In addition to those prescribed by the Constitution, the Governor has the following powers
and must perform the following duties:
( 1) He shall supervise the official conduct of all execufoTe and ministerial officers.
( 2) He shall see that all offices are
filled, and the duties thereof are performed,
or in default thereof, apply such remedy as the
law allows, and if the remedy is imperfect,
acquaint the legislature therewith at its next
session."

\i\Thenever any suit or legal proceeding is pending against this state, or which may
affect the title of this state to any property, or
which may result in any claim against the
state, he
direct the attorney general to
( 5)

29

appear on behalf of the state, and may employ such additional counsel as he may adjudge
expedient.
( 6) He may require the attorney general or the county attorney of any county to
inquire into the affairs or management of any
corporation doing business in the state.
(7) He may require the attorney general to aid any county attorney in the discharge
of his duties." (Emphasis added)

Regarding the Attorney General, The Constitution of
the Stale of Utah provides:
"The Attorney-General shall be the legal
adviser of the State officers, and shall perform
such other duties as may be provided by law."
Article VII, Section 18, Constitution of the
State of Utah.
The general statutory duties of the Attorney General
are set forth in Section 67-5-1, Utah Code Annotated
l 953, which in part provides:
"It is the duty of the attorney general:
( 1) To attend the Supreme Court of ·
this state, and all courts of the United States,
and prosecute or defend all causes to which the
state or any officer, board or com mission thereof in an official capacity is a party; and he
shall have charge as attorney of all ciYil legal
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matters in which the state is in anywise interested.
( 5) To exercise supervisory powers over
the district and county attorneys of the state
in all matters pertaining to the duties of their
of fices, and from time to time require of them
reports as to the condition of public business
entrusted to their charge.

( 7) 'iVhen required by the public service
or directed by the governor, to assist any district or county attorney in the discharge of his
duties.
( 12) To report to the governor, on the
first day of October preceding the regular biennial session of the legislature, the condition
of the affairs of his department, stating the
number, character, condition and result of the
actions prosecuted or defended by him on behalf of the state, and the amount of fines and
penalties collected. He shall include in his report copies of the reports of district and county attorneys, and shall direct attention to any
defect in the practical operation of the laws
relating to revenue and criminal offens es, and
suggest such amendments as in his judgment
are necessary to subserve the public interests."
(Emphasis added)

It is clear from the constitutional and statutory provisions provided above that the Attorney General is the
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chief legal officer of the State and the Governor is the
chief executiYe officer of the State. Any doubt that
the Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the
State of Utah was put to rest by the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah in II ansen v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State Legislature, 19 Utah 2d 231,
420 P. 2d 979 ( 1967), and it is difficult now to comprehend the change in position by that office. It is clear
that the Governor and Attorney General have supervisory powers over the district attorneys and county attorneys of the State. Accordingly, they and not the
district and county attorneys, who are subordinate officials, are the appropriate officials to be the parties in
this suit. To determine the impact of the laws of Utah
and to enjoin improper enforcement thereof, it should
be required that you have the main party in interest, not
their agents and employees. As is clear from the provisions of Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an action must be brought against the real party
in interest, and in this case, that is the Governor and the
Attorney General of the State of Utah.
That this is correct becomes even more clear by
examination of the provision of the Constitution and
Laws of the State of Utah dealing with the county attorney. Article VIII, Section 10, provides:
"A county attorney shall be elected by the
qualified voters of each county who shall hold
his office for a term of four years. The powers
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and duties of county attorneys, and such other
attorneys for the state as the legislature may
provide, shall be prescribed by law. In all cases
where the attorney for any county, or for the
state, fails or refuses to attend and procesute
according to law, the court shall have power to
appoint an attorney pro tem."
and Section 17-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, m
part provides:
"The county attorney is a public prosecutor and must :
Institute proceedings before the
proper magistrate for the arrest of persons
charged with, or reasonably suspected of, any
public offense when he has information that
any such offense has been committed, and for
that purpose must attend in person or by
deputy upon the magistrates in cases of arrests
when required by them.
(2)

( 3) At the request of the district attorney, assist him in the prosecution of public
offenses, and perform such other duties as are
or may be required by law.

Defend all actions brought against
the county; prosecute all actions for the recovery of debts, fines, penalties and forfeitures
accruing to the county."
( 6)
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It is quite clear that proceeding under subdivision ( 2)
of Section 17-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, a county attorney will institute proceedings before the proper
magistrate when he has information that any such offense has been committed. If his superior, the Attorney
General of the State of Utah, has been enjoined from
enforcing any statute which has been declared to have
a given meaning, he will know that no offense is committed when that action which might have been prohibited by the statute was performed. Accordingly, it
can readily be determined that the County Attorney is
responsible to and under the supervision of the Attorney General of the State of Utah in the carrying out
of his duties. Accordingly, the Attorney General, not
the county attorney, is the proper party to be joined.

This is equally true of the district attorney, from
the statutes governing that office. Section 67-7-4, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, provides:
"The district attorney shall, when it does
not conflict with his other official duties, attend to all legal business required of him in his
district by the attorney general, without
charge, when the interests of the state are involved ... " (Emphasis added)
The statute then goes on to state:
". . . . All the duties and powers of public
prosecutor shall be assumed and discharged by
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the district attorney, except in cases of prosecutions for misdemeanors not indictable, and
appeals to the district court therefrom and preliminary examinations before magistrates, but
the district attorney may, whenever he deems
it necessary, appear and prosecute for misdemeanors not indictable and in preliminary examinations before magistrates."
Section 67-7-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, then goes
on to provide the duties to be performed. It states:
"The district attorney shall appear and
prosecute for the state in the district court of
his district in all criminal prosecutions except
misdemeanor appeals, and in all civil cases in
which any county of his district may be interested when required to do so by the attorney
general in all such cases that may be appealed
to the Supreme Court; he shall attend the deliberations of the grand jury; he shall draw all
indictments and informations for offenses
against the laws of the state within his district,
and shall cause all persons indicted or informed
against to be speedily arraigned; he shall cause
all witnesses for the state to be subpoenaed to
appear before the court or grand jury; he
shall examine carefully into the sufficiency
of all appearance bonds that may be tendered
to the district court of his district, and upon
the order of the court shall institute proceedings in the name of the state for recovery upon
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the forfeiture of any appearance or other
bonds running to the state, and enforce the
collection thereof; and shall perform such
other duties as may be required by law."
Section 67-7-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, then goes
on to state:
"He shall also, on the first day of August
of each year, file a report with the attorney
general covering the preceding fiscal year,
stating the number of criminal prosecutions in
his district, the character of offenses charged,
the number of convictions, the amount of fines
and penalties imposed, and the amount collected. He shall call attention to any defect
in the operation of the laws, and suggest such
amendments as in his judgment are necessary
to perfect the same."
In sum, it can be seen by examination of the Constitution and statutes dealing with the relationship between the Attorney General, County Attorney and the
District Attorney, there is no question but that the latter two are under the supervision of the former and all
are under the supervision of the Governor. As such,
they are not necessary or proper parties to this action.
Any interest they might have would be represented in
full by their supervisor, the Attorney General of the
State of Utah.
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Accordingly, the holding and judgment of the
District Court should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the District
Court correctly decided the matter before the Court
when he construed Section 64-10-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to govern only inmates or patients in state
institutions (how they may be sterilized by the State)
and to have no application to citizens of the State of
Utah other than inmates or patients in state institutions.
The Trial Court correctly decided that this matter was
a proper class action and the parties brought before the
Court were the proper parties. His Judgment should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Salt Lake County Bar Legal
Services, Inc.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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